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Abstract
Background Poor adherence to medications is a global public health concern with substantial health and cost implications, 
especially for chronic conditions. In the USA, poor adherence is estimated to cause 125,000 deaths and cost $US100 bil-
lion annually. The most successful adherence-promoting strategies that have been identified so far have moderate effect, are 
relatively costly, and raise availability, feasibility, and/or scalability issues.
Objective The main objective of SIGMA (Study on Incentives for Glaucoma Medication Adherence) was to measure the 
effectiveness on medication adherence of a novel incentive strategy based on behavioral economics that we refer to as 
adherence-contingent rebates. These rebates offered patients a near-term benefit while leveraging loss aversion and regret 
and increasing the salience of adherence.
Methods SIGMA is a 6-month randomized, controlled, open-label, single-center superiority trial with two parallel arms. 
A total of 100 non-adherent glaucoma patients from the Singapore National Eye Centre were randomized into intervention 
(adherence-contingent rebates) and usual care (no rebates) arms in a 1:1 ratio. The primary outcome was the mean change 
from baseline in percentage of adherent days at Month 6. The trial registration number is NCT02271269 and a detailed study 
protocol has been published elsewhere.
Findings We found that participants who were offered adherence-contingent rebates were adherent to all their medications on 
73.1% of the days after 6 months, which is 12.2 percentage points (p = 0.027) higher than in those not receiving the rebates 
after controlling for baseline differences. This better behavioral outcome was achieved by rebates averaging 8.07 Singapore 
dollars ($US5.94 as of 2 November 2017) per month during the intervention period.
Conclusion This study shows that simultaneously leveraging several insights from behavioral economics can significantly 
improve medication adherence rates. The relatively low cost of the rebates and significant health and cost implications of 
medication non-adherence suggest that this strategy has the potential to cost-effectively improve health outcomes for many 
conditions.
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1 Introduction
In 2003, the World Health Organization reported that, in 
rich countries, only 50% of patients suffering from chronic 
disease were adherent to their medications [1]. The report 
concluded that increasing the effectiveness of adherence 
interventions may have a far greater impact on population 
health than any improvement in specific medical treatment 
[1]. Non-adherence to disease management has health and 
economic considerations. In the USA alone, poor adherence 
is estimated to cause 125,000 deaths and cost $US100 bil-
lion annually, with a considerable percentage coming from 
chronic diseases [2]. A large number of interventional 
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Key points for Decision Makers 
Even when treatment costs are reduced by generous pub-
lic subsidies and/or insurance coverage, many patients 
are not adherent to their medication regimens and there-
fore do not receive the full benefits of treatment.
This study shows that offering rebates on treatment costs 
to reward patients who are adherent to their medications 
can significantly increase adherence rates.
The novel incentive strategy can be deployed in a wide 
range of clinical settings and has a strong potential to be 
cost effective as it directs subsidies/reimbursements at 
those more likely to benefit from their treatment.
future self will regret [8]. By providing a near-term ben-
efit for adherence, the monetary incentive aims at nudging 
patients towards greater adherence. Further, individuals have 
been shown to dislike losses more than they like gains of the 
same amount—a phenomenon known as loss aversion [9]. 
For this reason, unlike a price discount or monetary reward, 
which the prior incentive studies tested, our incentive is 
designed as a rebate to invoke the loss aversion frame. With 
rebates, the patient has to pay for the medications upfront 
only to have the amount refunded if adherence is satisfac-
tory. Our incentive strategy also leverages regret [10] by 
informing patients who did not meet their adherence goal 
of the rebate amount they could have earned. Lastly, our 
strategy promotes the salience of the economic incentive 
by sending monthly messages reminding patients what is 
at stake. Leveraging loss aversion, regret, and salience is 
expected to have a larger impact than if the design solely 
offered a reward for meeting an adherence goal.
We assessed the effect of our adherence-contingent rebate 
strategy by means of a RCT conducted among 100 non-
adherent glaucoma patients at the Singapore National Eye 
Centre (SNEC). We focused on glaucoma because it is a 
condition where lack of adherence can lead to serious vision 
loss. Prior interventions targeting glaucoma patients and 
those with vision impairment more generally have largely 
focused on improving follow-up appointment adherence 
[11–13] and/or improving medication adherence through 
education and health communication interventions [14–19]. 
Despite these efforts, many patients remain non-adherent 
[20–22].
The main objective of SIGMA (Study on Incentives for 
Glaucoma Medication Adherence) was to provide evidence 
on whether adherence-contingent rebates can improve medi-
cation adherence among non-adherent glaucoma patients. 
We hypothesized that medication adherence would be higher 
among patients who can receive adherence-contingent 
rebates than in those who cannot. Secondary objectives were 
to determine whether intraocular pressure (IOP) and quality 
of life can also be improved, and whether the intervention 
represents a promising strategy to cost effectively improve 
glaucoma management. Finally, explanatory analysis aimed 
at uncovering factors that might moderate the intervention 
effect and explain medication adherence.
2  Methods
This section summarizes the most important features of the 
study. The detailed study protocol can be found elsewhere 
[23].
studies have since then been conducted but adherence rates 
have not noticeably improved [3–5].
A systematic literature review of randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs) testing interventions to improve medication 
adherence over a comprehensive range of medical disorders 
(excluding addictions) concluded that the few interventions 
that managed to improve both adherence and clinical out-
come were complex and involved frequent interaction with 
patients [6]. However, the review also concluded that these 
interventions were not very effective despite the effort and 
resources consumed. A recent review of RCTs testing inter-
ventions to improve medication adherence in the US con-
text classified the interventions into the following categories: 
patient education, medication regimen management, clinical 
pharmacist consultation, cognitive behavioral therapy, med-
ication-taking reminders, and incentives to promote adher-
ence [5]. While the review found some evidence of effective 
trials within each strategy, including three of the five trials 
that tested economic incentives, no clear recommendations 
emerged. Instead, the authors recommended choosing the 
intervention(s) based on availability and feasibility within a 
given practice or health system.
In this study we followed the recommendation from a 
review by Loewenstein et al. [7] in deploying insights from 
behavioral economics in efforts to increase the effective-
ness of medication adherence in a cost-effective and scalable 
manner. We operationalized this recommendation by design-
ing an incentive strategy that we refer to as adherence-con-
tingent rebates. The main component of this strategy is a 
monetary incentive that addresses a key challenge that all 
chronic disease patients face; they incur adherence costs in 
the present but reap the benefits far in the future. In such 
situations, decision makers have been shown to be biased 
towards the present and make suboptimal choices that their 
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2.1  Study Design
The study was designed as an open-label, single-site RCT 
with two parallel arms. A total of 100 non-adherent glau-
coma patients were block-randomized into the adherence-
contingent rebates and control groups in a 1:1 ratio based 
on the number of glaucoma medications prescribed (one vs. 
multiple eye drops). The sample size calculation was based 
on the ability to detect differences of ten percentage points 
in average monthly adherence rates assuming a two-sided 
test, αof 0.05, power of 0.8, and 20% loss to follow-up at 
Month 6. Recruitment took place between November 2014 
and April 2016, and the last follow-up assessment took place 
in January 2017.
2.2  Participants
All patients were recruited at the SNEC. The trial was reg-
istered before the recruitment of participants with the Clini-
calTrials.gov registration number NCT02271269. Eligible 
participants were non-adherent (8-item Morisky Medication 
Adherence Scale™ [MMAS-8] score ≤ 6 [24–26]) glau-
coma patients taking at least one eye drop medication aged 
between 21 and 85 years who were Singaporean citizens or 
permanent residents and conversant in English or Mandarin. 
The exclusion criteria included having Stage 4 (severe) or 
Stage 5 (end-stage) glaucoma according to the glaucoma 
staging system based on the Humphrey Visual Field [27], 
and having significant co-morbid conditions preventing 
application of medication without assistance.
2.3  Intervention
Both the intervention and control groups received usual care, 
which consists of routine check-ups with an ophthalmologist 
and counseling sessions with a nurse on effective glaucoma 
treatment, underlining the health risks raised by non-adher-
ence to the medication regimen. The nurse also determines a 
dosing schedule for each medication that accommodates the 
patients’ lifestyle taking into account working hours.
The intervention group was given the opportunity to earn 
rebates on their treatment costs (glaucoma-related medica-
tion and check-up costs) contingent on meeting the target 
adherence, while the control group was given a non-contin-
gent payment at Months 3 and 6. Rebates were earned based 
on the percentage of adherent days. Participants achieving a 
medication adherence ≥ 90% of days received a 50% rebate 
on their treatment costs, while those who had adherence 
between 75% and 90% received a 25% rebate.
We defined medication adherence as taking all prescribed 
daily glaucoma medications within their appropriate dosing 
windows. Type and number of glaucoma medications as well 
as dosing windows were tailored to the specific needs of 
each patient. We defined up to three windows per day (morn-
ing, afternoon, and evening) of a duration of 6–8 h each [23]. 
When a patient fails to take any dose on time, the whole day 
was counted as non-adherent. We chose this rather strin-
gent definition of medication adherence to account for the 
fact that not only elevated IOP but also variations in IOP 
are important risk factors of disease progression [28–31]. 
For the same reason, we decided to incentivize near-perfect 
adherence by setting a demanding goal (90% adherence) 
while setting a less demanding intermediary goal (75% 
adherence) in our efforts to encourage those with low adher-
ence levels at baseline and who might initially see the higher 
goal as unattainable. Medication adherence was monitored 
using the medication tracker eCAP™ (Information Mediary 
Corporation, Ottawa, ON, Canada), a medication container 
mounted with an electronic cap that records the time when-
ever the cap is closed. Each glaucoma eye drop bottle was 
stored in a separate eCAP™.
Participants learned about their arm allocation by phone 
the month following their enrolment in order to collect 
1 month of baseline data on medication adherence using 
the medication trackers. At Months 3 and 6, the medica-
tion trackers were collected and medication adherence was 
assessed for Months 2–3 and Months 4–6, respectively. The 
patient timeline is described in detail in Fig. 1. Adherence 
reports were sent to the adherence-contingent rebates group 
in efforts to increase the salience of the payments and gen-
erate regret among those participants who were not suffi-
ciently adherent. Similar adherence reports were sent to the 
control group, with the only difference being that there was 
no mention of financial incentive. We also sent standardized 
SMS reminders to all participants at the end of Week 1 and 
Months 1–5, in addition to making follow-up phone calls. 
Samples of the adherence reports and SMS reminders sent to 
the participants and phone call prompts are found in Fig. 2. 
2.4  Outcomes
The primary outcome of this study was the mean change 
from baseline in the percentage of adherent days at the end 
of the intervention period (Month 6). As secondary out-
comes, we measured the monthly proportion of participants 
meeting the adherence target set for the intervention group 
to earn rebates, which is ≥ 75% and ≥ 90% of adherent days, 
respectively. Although power was limited, we also meas-
ured changes from baseline in IOP, generic health status 
EQ-5D-5L [32] score, and Glaucoma Quality of Life-15 
(GQL-15) [33] score. We generated the EQ-5D-5L score 
by mapping the EQ-5D-3L Singapore value set by Luo and 
Wang [34] using the transition probability matrix by van 
Hout et al. [35]. Other secondary outcomes were incen-
tive amount earned at Month 6, which corresponds to the 
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RO discusses study with patient and asks for informed consent
If patient consents, RO verifies eligibility
If eligible, paent is randomized into one study arm 
(allocaon not yet revealed)
Potential patient referred to RO by  
ophthalmologist
Baseline assessment:
- IOP measured
- Study questionnaire administered
- eCAPTM(s) issued with patient instruction leaflet
Enrolment to end of Month 1:
Baseline assessment period for 
medication adherenceEnd of week 1:Follow up phone call
SMS reminder sent
End of Month 1:
Reveal randomisation to patient by phone
SMS reminder sent
Month 3 Assessment:
- eCAPTM(s) collected from patient by courier 
service
- medication adherence calculated
- adherence report sent to patient and eCAPTM(s)  
returned
End of Month 2:
Follow up phone call
SMS reminder sent
End of Month 4 to end of 
Month 6:
Follow-up assessment period 
for medication adherence
End of Month 5:
Follow up phone call
SMS reminder sent
Month 6 Assessment:
- IOP measured
- Study questionnaire administered
- eCAPTM(s) returned by patient
- medication adherence calculated and report 
sent to patient
End of Month 4:
Follow up phone call
SMS reminder sent
Fig. 1  Patient timeline. IOP intraocular pressure, RO research optometrist
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Fig. 2  Samples of SMS reminders, phone call prompts, and adherence reports sent to the participants
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adherence level recorded by the primary outcome, and 
the mean change in the percentage of adherent days from 
Months 2–5. Explanatory outcomes included alternative 
measures of medication adherence even though these were 
not incentivized directly. These included the mean change 
from baseline in adherent days irrespective of time win-
dows and mean change from baseline in dose adherence 
both according to and irrespective of the time windows. As 
control and moderating variables, we also administered the 
Brief Illness Perception Questionnaire (BIPQ) [36] and the 
specific subscale of the Beliefs about Medication Question-
naire (BMQ) [37] at baseline and calculated the correspond-
ing scores.
2.5  Statistical Analysis
Mean change from baseline in monthly adherence, IOP, EQ-
5D-5L score, and GQL-15 score were all linearly regressed 
on a binary variable indicating group membership (adher-
ence-contingent rebates vs. control), their baseline level, 
average number of prescribed doses per day at baseline, 
change from baseline in the average number of daily doses 
prescribed, sociodemographic characteristics at baseline 
(age, language spoken, household monthly income), and 
IOP, BIPQ, and BMQ scores at baseline. The proportions 
of participants with a percentage of adherent days above 
75% and 90% were regressed on the same variables using 
a logistic regression. Next, the models described earlier 
were extended by adding interaction terms between poten-
tial intervention moderators (presence of co-morbidities, 
glaucoma- and non-glaucoma-related medication regimen, 
potential incentive amount, BIPQ and BMQ variables, and 
patient sociodemographic characteristics) and the binary 
variable indicating study arms. Lastly, medication adher-
ence levels at baseline were linearly regressed on potential 
factors of medication adherence (presence of co-morbidities, 
glaucoma- and non-glaucoma-related medication regimen, 
BIPQ and BMQ variables, and patient sociodemographic 
characteristics). As the perspective of the analysis was that 
of an intention to treat, all missing data were imputed by a 
Markov chain Monte Carlo method using all the variables 
included in the models.
3  Results
The 100 participants were recruited through doctor refer-
ral; 64.5% of eligible patients who were referred agreed to 
take part in the study. Figure 3 shows the CONSORT (Con-
solidated Standards of Reporting Trials) flow diagram that 
details the path to enrollment in the study and Fig. 4 pro-
vides more information on missing data patterns for the pri-
mary outcome. Overall, 92% of participants completed the 
study and the primary outcome was successfully recorded 
for 83% of the participants at Month 6.
Table 1 displays the characteristics of the enrolled par-
ticipants. The study participants were 64.7 years old on 
average. The most common participant was male, married, 
and with a primary education or less. Roughly half of the 
participants were Mandarin-speaking, while the other half 
were English-speaking. Of the participants, 43% lived in a 
household with monthly income less than 2000 Singapore 
dollars ($S). On average, the MMAS-8 score was 3.80, indi-
cating low adherence, while participants were adherent on 
76% of the days during the 1-month baseline assessment, 
likely due to the initial effect from monitoring adherence 
and joining the study. In addition, 31.8% of participants did 
not meet the goal of 75% adherent days and 61.5% did not 
achieve the goal of 90% of adherent days. At 18.3 mmHg, 
average IOP was close to the upper bound (20 mmHg) of the 
normal range for this risk factor and GLQ and EQ 5D-5L 
scores were 19.3 and 0.88, respectively. The average medica-
tion regimen consisted in taking 2.3 doses of eye drops per 
day. These include the following common medications for 
glaucoma: β-blockers, adrenergic agonists, parasympathetic 
agonists, carbonic anhydrase inhibitors, prostaglandin ana-
logs, and hyperosmotic agents [38]. There was no significant 
difference in baseline characteristics between the two study 
groups.
Table 2 shows the average outcomes pre- and post-inter-
vention along with the intervention effect at Month 6. It first 
should be noted that measurement of medication adherence 
dropped by 14.9 percentage points in the control group 
between baseline and Month 6. Month 6 medication adher-
ence in the control group was 61.6% after the likely vanish-
ing of the initial effect from joining the study and receiving 
medication trackers. As is discussed in Sect. 4 with regards 
to the limitations of the study, we think that this figure rep-
resents a reasonable assessment of medication adherence in 
the absence of rebates in the real world.
Our main finding is that medication adherence at Month 6 
was 12.2 (p = 0.027) percentage points higher in the adher-
ence-contingent rebates group than in the control group 
after adjusting for baseline differences. The proportion of 
participants with more than 75% and 90% of adherent days 
was higher in the intervention group by 8.2 (p = 0.372) and 
12.5 (p = 0.169) percentage points, respectively, but the sam-
ple size was likely too low for these secondary outcomes to 
achieve statistical significance. Only non-clinically meaning-
ful and statistically insignificant differences in IOP (0.687), 
GQL score (0.452), and EQ5D-5L (0.001) were observed 
at Month 6. Adherence-contingent rebates averaged $S8.07 
($US5.94 as of 2 November 2017) among all intervention 
group participants during Month 6 when the primary out-
come was recorded.
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The incremental effect of adherence-contingent rebates 
dropped to 5.7 percentage points (p = 0.26) when medi-
cation adherence was defined as the percentage of days 
where all doses were taken irrespective of time. This means 
that approximately half the intervention effect came from 
encouraging participants that were already taking all their 
daily medications to take them during the appropriate time 
windows, while the other half came from encouraging par-
ticipants not to miss entire days. Though not statistically 
significant, the adherence-contingent rebates group also had 
greater levels of the total number of doses taken on time 
and total doses taken irrespective of time windows than the 
control group by 8.2 (p = 0.09) and 3.8 (p = 0.34) percentage 
points, respectively.
Figure 5 shows the monthly evolution of the unadjusted 
mean of adherence in both study groups (Fig. 5a) and of 
the incremental effect of adherence-contingent rebates 
(Fig. 5b). During Months 2 and 3, the incremental effect 
Source: Author calculations using the program management documentations.
47 (94.0%) Analyzed
0 (0%) Excluded from analysis
45 (90.0%) Analyzed
0 (0%) Excluded from analysis
Analysis
47 (94.0%) Completed the study
3 (6.0%) Withdrew from the study
1 (2.0%) Felt courier was troublesome
1 (2.0%) Got hospitalized
1 (2.0%) Got discharged by the doctor
45 (9.0%) Completed the study
5 (10.0%) Withdrew from the study
3 (6.0%) Felt eCAP™/questionnaire was troublesome
1 (2.0%) Got hospitalized
1 (2.0%) Uncontactable
Follow-Up
50 (50%) Adherence-contingent rebate
50 (%) Received allocated intervention
0 (%) Did not receive allocated intervention
50 (50%) Control
50 (%) Received allocated intervention
0 (%) Did not receive allocated intervention
Allocation
100 (64.5%) Randomized
55 (35.5%) Declined
155 (69.5%) Eligible
Enrollment
68 (30.5%) Excluded
17 (7.62%) Not on medication
23 (10.3%) Patient is adherent based on MMAS
1 (0.45%) More than 85 years old
2 (0.90%) Non-citizen
5 (2.24%) Unable to speak English/Chinese
18 (8.07%) Advanced glaucoma
2 (0.90%) Already taking part in another study
223 Assessed for eligibility 
Fig. 3  Study CONSORT (Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials) flow diagram (source: author calculations using the program management 
documentation. MMAS Morisky Medication Adherence Scale™
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of adherence-contingent rebates amounted to only 0.61 
(p = 0.84) and 3.34 (p = 0.47) percentage points. What 
mainly took place during these 2 months is the wearing off 
of the monitoring effect, with adherence rates decreasing 
from around 76% to around 65% in both groups. After the 
first incentive payment was made between Months 3 and 4, 
the intervention effect kicked in as shown by the marked 
increase at Month 4 (10.4 percentage points; p = 0.04). The 
intervention effect then slightly dropped during Month 5 and 
increased again during Month 6 following the text message 
promoting study compliance to all participants and remind-
ing intervention group participants of the incentive scheme 
that was sent between Months 5 and 6.
As an additional analysis, we explored whether various 
factors moderated the effect of adherence-contingent rebates 
by including interaction terms between potential moderators 
and the dummy variable indicating the study group. Results 
from these estimations are shown in Table 3. While the sta-
tistical power was limited for such an analysis and the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected, results nonetheless suggest 
that the intervention effect may increase with the number 
of glaucoma-related medication doses to be taken given the 
observed 3.8 percentage points increase in adherent days per 
dose (p = 0.26). Furthermore, our results suggest that each 
dollar of incentivized treatment cost may increase adherent 
days, given the observed 0.092 percentage points increase 
during the month (p = 0.29). Regarding potential distribu-
tional issues, our study did not reveal any clear association 
between intervention effect and household income.
Lastly, we explored determinants of medication adher-
ence at baseline. The results are reported in Table 4. The 
only factor that we found to have a statistically significant 
effect is the number of medication doses to be taken daily 
by the participants. An increase by one daily dose decreased 
adherent days by 4.8 percentage points (p = 0.01).
4  Discussion
Our main finding is that, after 5 months, participants in the 
adherence-contingent rebates group had higher medication 
adherence than in the control group by 12.2 percentage 
points (p = 0.027) after controlling for baseline differences. 
While this is the first study applying monetary incentives 
to improve medication adherence in glaucoma, the behav-
ioral change we found is larger than those reported in other 
disease areas. A prior study found that cash incentives 
improved adherent days to antihypertensive medications 
Fig. 4  Missing data patterns 
for the primary outcome. Note: 
by the end of Month 6, 538 
(89.7%) monthly observa-
tions of the primary outcome 
were collected. Among the 
participants, 8% had missing 
observations due to withdrawal 
and discontinuation from the 
study and 9% due to a faulty or 
lost eCAP™ (source: author 
calculations using the data col-
lected from the study)
MONTH 2
3 (6.00%)4 (8.00%)
MONTH 3
1 (2.00%)5 (10.0%)
MONTH 4
8 (16.0%)6 (12.0%)
MONTH 5
8 (16.0%)6 (12.0%)
MONTH 6
7 (14.0%)6 (12.0%)
MONTH 1 
(BASELINE)
3 (6.00%)5 (10.0%)
CONTROL
(N=50)
ADHERENCE-CONTINGENT 
REBATE
(N=50)
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Table 1  Baseline sample 
characteristics, overall and by 
study group
Source: authors’ estimates using the data collected from the study
BIPQ Brief Illness Perception Questionnaire, BMQ Beliefs about Medication Questionnaire, GQL Glau-
coma Quality of Life, MMAS-8 8-item Morisky Medication Adherence Scale™, SD standard deviation, $S 
Singapore dollars
a The authors have obtained written permission from copyright owners for any excerpts from copyrighted 
works that are included and have credited the sources in the Article or the Supplemental Materials. The 
credit footnote is located in the copyright agreement
Characteristic Overall
(n = 100)
Study group
Control
(n = 50)
Adherence-
contingent 
rebates
(n = 50)
Primary outcome
 Adherent days (%) 76.1 76.5 75.8
Secondary outcomes
 Proportion of patients with adherence ≥ 75% (%) 69.2 69.6 68.9
 Proportion of patients with adherence ≥ 90% (%) 38.5 39.1 37.8
 Intraocular pressure [mean (SD)] 18.4 (5.03) 18.3 (5.34) 18.5 (4.75)
 GQL score [mean (SD)] 19.3 (6.56) 18.5 (4.31) 20.0 (8.20)
 EQ-5D-5L score [mean (SD)] 0.879 (0.159) 0.880 (0.151) 0.878 (0.169)
Explanatory outcomes
 Days all doses were taken at any time (%) 83.6 83.4 83.9
 Doses taken on time (%) 85.3 84.5 86.1
 Doses taken at any time (%) 90.3 89.5 91.1
Sociodemographic characteristics
 Age [mean (SD)] 64.7 (10.6) 64.4 (1.79) 64.9 (1.16)
 Female (%) 39.0 32.0 46.0
 Mandarin-speaking (%) 48.0 54.0 42.0
Highest level of education (%)
  Primary and lower 41.4 38.0 44.9
  Secondary 36.4 40.0 32.7
  Tertiary 22.2 22.0 22.5
 Married (%) 67.7 72.0 63.3
 Employed (%) 45.5 48.0 42.9
 Household monthly income (%)
  <  $S2000 43.1 52.2 35.7
  $S2000–3999 17.7 13.0 21.4
  $S4000–5999 19.6 17.4 21.4
  ≥  $S6000 19.6 17.4 21.4
 Type of housing (%)
  1- to 3-room flat 27.3 28.0 26.5
  4-room flat 39.4 42.0 36.7
  ≥  5-room flat 19.2 16.0 22.5
  Condo/bungalow 14.1 14.0 14.3
No. of household residents [mean (SD)] 3.71 (1.98) 3.74 (2.07) 3.67 (1.91)
Other patient characteristics
 No. of daily doses [mean (SD)] 2.31 (1.54) 2.18 (1.51) 2.45 (1.58) 
 MMAS-8a score [mean (SD)] 3.81 (1.48) 3.90 (1.23) 3.72 (1.70)
 BIPQ score [mean (SD)] 35.5 (10.7) 34.5 (10.7) 36.5 (10.6)
 BMQ score [mean (SD)] 30.0 (6.14) 30.4 (6.72) 29.6 (5.51)
850 M. Bilger et al.
by 6.2 percentage points [39]. Various designs of lottery 
incentives have been shown to improve adherence to anti-
coagulation medications by 2.6 [40], 4.3 [41], and 7.4 [40] 
percentage points and to hypertension/hyperlipidemia medi-
cations by 2.6 [42] percentage points, but only the largest 
effect achieved statistical significance. One study found that 
deposit contracts did not change adherence to hypertension 
and hyperlipidemia medications [42]. While a head-to-head 
trial would be needed to test this hypothesis, theory and 
our results suggest that leveraging multiple insights from 
behavioral economics can improve outcomes compared to 
relying on a single incentive strategy. Moreover, leveraging 
loss aversion, regret, and salience via the novel adherence-
contingent rebates we propose can be achieved at virtually 
no additional cost.
As in other studies that aimed at improving adherence to 
glaucoma medications [18, 19], the duration of our study 
was too short to observe improvements in health outcomes. It 
should also be noted that, as adherence rebates were awarded 
as a percentage of treatment costs, the average rebate amount 
is dependent on the cost of drug therapy of each partici-
pant, and might therefore not generalize well outside the 
study. Our intervention nonetheless has the potential to be 
cost effective in the long-term as, with an average incentive 
amount of $US5.94 per month per patient, the behavioral 
change achieved by adherence-contingent rebates came at 
a low cost. Furthermore, the supporting medication tracker 
used costs around $US60 per unit; a device that can operate 
for up to 3 years based on the manufacturer’s specifications. 
Labor costs were also kept at a minimum by automating 
adherence and incentive calculations. Taking a conservative 
estimate of $US250 per year including incentive payments, 
rebate would only need to improve average quality-adjusted 
life-year (QALY) weights by 0.005 to be cost effective using 
a willingness to pay of $US50,000 per QALY. By signifi-
cantly promoting the adequate use of effective medications 
that slow or stop disease progression, adherence-contingent 
rebates have the potential to generate such improvement in 
QALY weights in the long-term. A longer study is needed to 
detect potential improvements in quality of life and clinical 
outcomes, and assess the long-term cost effectiveness of the 
adherence-contingent rebates. Showing health improvements 
is especially challenging in chronic diseases such as glau-
coma, diabetes mellitus, and hypertension as these condi-
tions are asymptomatic in their early stages and quality of 
life is initially not affected. For glaucoma, a relatively rapid 
progression such as a loss of 2 decibels in visual sensitiv-
ity per year would take about 15 years to evolve from full 
normal field to perimetric blindness [43].
It should be highlighted that our study focused on non-
adherent patients. In the real world, the intervention effect 
would be diluted as those patients who are already adherent 
would receive rebates without behavioral change. Thus, a 
crucial factor to consider is the proportion of patients who 
are not adherent to their medications. With high rates of non-
adherence reported globally and across countless disease 
Table 2  Pre- and post-intervention outcomes per study group and incremental effect of adherence-contingent rebates at Month 6
Source: author calculations using the data collected from the study
CI confidence interval, GQL Glaucoma Quality of Life
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **statistically significant at the 5% level
a Calculated as the difference in change from baseline at Month 6 between that adherence-contingent rebates and control groups
Outcomes Average change from baseline at Month 6 Incremental effect of adherence-
contingent  rebatesa
Control (%) Adherence-contingent 
rebates (%)
Estimate (%) 95% CI
Primary outcome
 Adherent days – 14.9** – 2.73 12.2** 1.43 to 22.9
Secondary outcomes
 Proportion of patients with adherence ≥ 75% – 21.4** – 13.2* 8.2 – 9.8 to 26.2
 Proportion of patients with adherence ≥ 90% – 19.6** – 7.1 12.5 – 5.3 to 30.2
 Intraocular pressure – 2.88** – 2.20** 0.687 – 0.786 to 2.16
 GQL – 1.40* – 0.951 0.452 – 1.64 to 2.54
 EQ-5D-5L 0.016 0.017 0.001 – 0.075 to 0.077
 Mean cost of financial incentives 8.07 5.06 to 11.1
Explanatory outcomes
 Days where all doses were taken irrespective of time – 13.9** – 8.19** 5.67 – 4.38 to 15.7
 Doses taken on time – 13.0** – 4.88** 8.16* – 1.35 to 17.7
 Doses taken irrespective of time – 11.3** – 7.50** 3.80 – 4.15 to 11.8
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areas, it is not expected that the effect of adherence-contin-
gent rebates would be overly diluted, but dilution is still a 
consideration to bear in mind when setting adherence goals.
In the real world, new technology can be used to further 
reduce the cost of adherence monitoring via wireless pill 
boxes that can store multiple medications combined with a 
smartphone application or a cloud service [44–46]. Medi-
cation adherence for a wide range of chronic diseases such 
as diabetes and hypertension can be monitored using such 
technology [47–49], which can then serve as the vehicle 
for monetary incentives based on behavioral economics 
principles such as in our study [50]. Technological progress 
will also make it easier to identify the users and integrated 
information systems will allow automatic comparison of 
medication adherence with medication purchases to prevent 
cheating.
In an effort to make such a strategy more affordable 
to healthcare payers, instead of awarding new rebates to 
adherent patients as in this study, one alternative would be 
to make existing public financing contingent on medication 
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adherence. In many health systems, medications are fully 
or partially reimbursed via public insurance schemes and/
or public subsidies are used to decrease the price of medi-
cations at the point of consumption. The idea would be to 
leverage such public financing to improve medication adher-
ence and, ultimately, health outcomes. This approach would 
have the advantage of providing a sustained incentive for 
medication adherence, which is especially important given 
the lack of evidence for habit formation following discon-
tinuation of monetary incentives [51]. A further rationale for 
making existing public financing contingent on medication 
adherence is that many countries use cost-effectiveness 
thresholds to include healthcare in their insurance coverage 
and packages of subsidized care. By focusing their reim-
bursements and subsidies on those medications that are 
appropriately taken, these countries could obtain a more 
favorable cost-effectiveness ratio.
Whether existing or new public financing is used to pay 
for adherence-contingent rebates, it is crucial to avoid unin-
tended redistributional consequences. A potential equity 
concern is that low-income patients might be more affected 
by the out-of-pocket cost of medications and could be less 
adherent as a result. Other factors such as education might 
also play a role. While we did not find any clear association 
between socioeconomic status and intervention benefit, this 
is not guaranteed to be the case in other contexts, especially 
where individuals may be liquidity constrained and unable 
to pay in advance for medicines. If implemented, it would 
be important to monitor the benefit incidence of the program 
and consider corrective actions such as tying the rebate size 
and/or adherence goals to patient income if distributional 
concerns arose.
Table 3  Estimation of the moderating effect of select baseline charac-
teristics on the effect of adherence-contingent rebates on medication 
adherence
Source: author calculations using the data collected from the study
BIPQ Brief Illness Perception Questionnaire, BMQ Beliefs about 
Medication Questionnaire, CI confidence interval
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **statistically significant at 
the 5% level
Baseline characteristic Interaction between baseline char-
acteristic and intervention indicator
Estimate 95% CI
Percentage of adherent days – 2.79 – 44.7 to 39.1
Average number of daily doses 3.81 – 2.90 to 10.5
Age – 0.218 – 1.29 to 0.852
Mandarin-speaking – 0.553 – 21.3 to 20.1
Household monthly income 
 <  $US2000 (reference) (reference)
 $US2000–3999 – 3.65 – 41.3 to 34.0
 $US4000–5999 – 14.2 – 47.3 to 19.0
 ≥  $US6000 – 1.12 – 34.1 to 31.9
Intraocular pressure 0.334 – 1.64 to 2.31
BMQ score – 0.419 – 2.17 to 1.33
BIPQ score – 0.054 – 1.04 to 0.932
Treatment cost 0.092 – 0.080 to 0.263
Female – 2.15 – 25.2 to 20.9
Highest level of education
 Primary and lower (reference) (reference)
 Secondary 8.06 – 16.3 to 32.4
 Tertiary 9.07 – 22.9 to 41.1
Type of housing
 1- to 3-room flat (reference) (reference)
 4-room flat 10.5 – 16.5 to 37.5
 ≥  5-room flat – 8.67 – 39.6 to 22.2
 Condo/bungalow 2.76 – 32.6 to 38.1
Married – 6.85 – 29.8 to 16.0
Employed – 2.65 – 23.7 to 18.4
Taking other medications – 7.46 – 31.2 to 16.3
Table 4  Determinants of medication adherence at baseline in percent-
age points of adherent days
Source: author calculations using the data collected from the study
BIPQ Brief Illness Perception Questionnaire, BMQ Beliefs about 
Medication Questionnaire, CI confidence interval
*Statistically significant at the 10% level; **statistically significant at 
the 5% level
Baseline characteristic Estimate 95% CI
Average no. of daily doses – 4.83** – 8.58 to – 1.07
Female 3.71 – 8.95 to 16.4
Age 0.018 – 0.698 to 0.734
Mandarin-speaking 5.65 – 8.85 to 20.1
Married – 3.30 – 17.0 to 10.4
Highest level of education
 Primary and lower (reference) (reference)
 Secondary 10.3 – 7.19 to 27.9
 Tertiary – 3.80 – 22.5 to 14.9
Employed – 2.49 – 16.8 to 11.8
Household monthly income
 <  $US2000 (reference) (reference)
 $US2000–3999 – 1.72 – 22.1 to 18.7
 $US4000–5999 6.54 – 15.4 to 28.5
 ≥  $US6000 10.1 – 16.0 to 36.1
Intraocular pressure 0.075 – 1.28 to 1.43
Taking other medication – 10.8 – 25.9 to 4.25
BMQ score 0.167 – 0.784 to 1.12
BIPQ score – 0.053 – 0.689 to 0.582
Constant 83.5** 13.1 to 154
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It is worth mentioning that incentives can be implemented 
in countless ways [51]. We chose a theory-based approach 
that we postulated to be both effective and cost effective in 
the context of chronic disease management in a rich coun-
try. Future research can explore other strategies in an effort 
to improve upon this design. Further research should also 
look into how to adapt our strategy to low-income coun-
tries where patients may have little disposable income to 
buy their medications. A potential idea to explore would 
be to include adherence-contingent incentives into existing 
conditional cash transfer schemes which have been widely 
used in low-income settings [52].
A limitation of the study is that measurement of adher-
ence is confounded by the effect of the medication trackers 
that are required for the measurement. However, as medica-
tion trackers are used in both study groups, this Hawthorne 
effect [53] does not bias the measurement of the incremental 
effect of adherence-contingent rebates compared with the 
control group. Still, both groups likely increased adherence 
at the start of the study beyond normal levels both because 
of adherence monitoring and due to joining a study. Regard-
ing measurement of adherence in the absence of rebates in 
the real world, we think that this is more reliably captured 
by the adherence levels recorded in the control group at the 
end of the study when the initial effect from being a study 
participant and being observed is likely to have vanished.
Furthermore, measurement of the primary outcome criti-
cally depended on the participants keeping their medica-
tions stored in their tracking devices. This study require-
ment was emphasized at recruitment and reiterated during 
follow-up calls. A potential downside of the follow-up calls, 
though, is that these reminders might have contributed to 
improving medication adherence in the control group. In 
addition, the adherence reports sent to the participants 
might have acted as non-monetary rewards, and might also 
have contributed to improving medication adherence in 
the control group. However, as both study groups received 
the same reminders and adherence reports, we were able 
to measure the incremental effect of adherence-contingent 
rebates compared with the control group without bias. 
Further, a recent literature review suggests that reward fre-
quency has an effect, with more frequent incentive pay-
ments being more effective at generating behavioral changes 
[51]. Real-world implementation of our study intervention 
could, therefore, have additional effectiveness if the rebates 
were paid at each medication refill instead of waiting for 
2–3 months. Furthermore, in efforts to counter and detect 
potential gaming, participants were asked to sign a par-
ticipation oath [54] and their medication purchases were 
monitored by the study team. Lastly, with 100 participants, 
the study has limited power for secondary and explanatory 
analyses. As such, results that were not statistically signifi-
cant have been interpreted with caution.
5  Conclusion
Adherence-contingent rebates extend the concepts of 
accountability, value-based insurance designs, and condi-
tional cash transfers by creating a strategy where cost shar-
ing depends not only on the effectiveness of the medications 
but also on how effectively these medications are used. With 
the explosion of healthcare costs that are increasingly driven 
by modifiable risk factors, including poor medication adher-
ence, it is time to extend accountable care all the way to the 
patient level.
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